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1 
 
E. O. Wilson’s 1998 book Consilience:  The Unity of Knowledge 
seeks to persuade readers to integrate knowledge “from the natural 
sciences with that of the social sciences and humanities.”1  
Wilson’s stated intent is to offer the “strongest appeal” for the 
linkage of the natural sciences with the social sciences and 
humanities, an appeal based on “the prospect of intellectual 
adventure and, given even modest success, the value of 
understanding the human condition with a higher degree of 
certainty” (WC, 9).  He believes that the biological sciences have 
much to say about the human condition, and that only by 
breaching “the boundary that separates the natural sciences on one 
side from the humanities and humanistic social sciences on the 
other” can we begin to truly understand human social behavior 
(WC, 125).  In short, the connection that links the “deep, mostly 
genetic history of the species as a whole to the more recent cultural 
histories of its far-flung societies” is something that should be 
further explored by scientists willing to cross disciplinary 
boundaries (WC, 126). 
 
 
2 
 
However, Wilson is the first to admit that his book’s promotion of 
consilience across the great branches of learning has been 
something less than fully persuasive to his audience.  Commenting 
on the negative reception his book received, he says, “Frankly I’m 
rather surprised that this idea – or shall we say prophecy or 
projection – has met so much resistance.”2  Most who have 
responded to Wilson’s book have been unimpressed with his 
arguments, judging the book harshly for what they see as the 
arrogant, unapologetic, and uncompromising way that Wilson 
promotes his agenda.  They have rejected many of his claims as 
“fatally weak” and “indefensible,” they are outraged by the 
“contempt” with which he treats the social sciences and the 
humanities, they proclaim the book “a martyr to its own 
hyperbole,” and they remain “unconvinced” by his vision.3   While 
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it is true that some readers like the book, a great many more reject 
it, forcing Wilson to admit that the book was not as persuasive as 
he had hoped, and to wonder why it did not appeal to his audience 
in the way he planned. 
 
3 
 
I have traced this reception elsewhere, and have produced a close 
reading of the text that offers a rhetorical explanation for the many 
negative responses it received.  The nub of the matter is that the 
pervasive metaphors of disciplinary conquest that Wilson used in 
Consilience to promote boundary crossing were perfectly designed 
to anger readers who were not already converts to his cause, and 
the unambiguous reductionism he embraced was unacceptable 
even to his most ardent supporters.4   But I have also indicated 
that some readers sensed a “softer Wilson” hiding behind the 
brash overstatements, a more balanced voice that had the potential 
to be persuasive if it had not been drowned out by the rhetoric of 
the rest of book.5 
 
 
4 
 
In this paper, I will push at that “softer” voice to reveal how even 
the most cautious passages of Wilson’s Consilience are written in a 
way that is more likely to increase the division between people 
from different domains of knowledge than to bring them together.  
I critique this book not to urge the rejection of genetic 
explanations for human social behavior as hopelessly 
oversimplified and ideologically suspect.  After all, I think that the 
goal of Wilson’s book is admirable; the boundary between the two 
cultures should be breached, and genetic explanation should be 
explored in the social sciences and humanities.  Instead I offer this 
rhetorical critique so that Wilson and his supporters might no 
longer be surprised by strong resistance to his claims.  With a 
better understanding of the rhetorical structure of his book, 
Wilson and his allies could adopt a style of scholarly debate more 
well designed to persuade than to aggravate.  I believe that if 
Wilson and his supporters were to more fully recognize the 
rhetorical resources that are available, they would find it easier to 
build support for their research and recruit colleagues to their 
cause. 
 
 
5 
 
The assumption under which I am working is that the “softer” 
voice of Wilson is not a sham to be exposed or a cunning lie to be 
made more effective, nor is the “harder” voice of Wilson a more 
truthful representation of his beliefs.  Instead each are attempts by 
Wilson to achieve his persuasive goal – to inspire readers to apply 
genetics to the study of human social behavior.  I suspect that 
Wilson’s argument is restricted by the limits of his rhetorical 
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invention, and that he might achieve his stated goals more 
adequately if he recognizes other means of persuasion that are 
available to him. 
 
6 
 
To reveal the factors that diminish the persuasive potential of even 
the most balanced passages of Wilson’s Consilience, and to sketch 
the outline of a more promising rhetorical approach available to 
Wilson and his supporters, I will contrast Wilson’s rhetoric with 
that of another biologist who, long ago, wrote a book with a very 
similar goal.  In 1962, Theodosius Dobzhansky’s Mankind 
Evolving:  The Evolution of the Human Species sought “to explore 
the possibilities of understanding mankind as a product of 
evolution . . . to explore how far the evolution of man can be 
understood from the vantage point of modern genetics and of the 
biological theory of evolution.”6  Like Wilson, Dobzhansky 
bemoaned the trend of the social sciences “to favor the view that 
biological sciences are utterly useless in attempting to understand 
human societies” (DME, 15).  Because Dobzhansky believed 
genetics and evolutionary theory would tell us a great deal about 
human social behavior, he wrote a book to overcome the 
estrangement of the biological and social sciences (DME, 287, 
330). 
 
 
7 
 
A close look at the substance of Wilson’s and Dobzhansky’s books 
reveals that, although Wilson wrote with the advantage of the more 
advanced state of knowledge in genetics available to a scientist in 
the late 1990s, the two authors were really not all that far apart in 
their substantive understanding of the evolution of behavior.  Both 
recognize that environment and heredity collaborate to create 
particular human behavioral traits (e.g., compare WC, 138-41 and 
DME, 44-46, 88-90); both understand that genes shape culture 
and that cultures shape genepools (e.g., see WC, 165 and DME, 19-
20); and both believe that biology should unite with the social 
sciences and the humanities to help explain human behavior (e.g., 
see WC, 267 and DME, 287).  In fact, the two authors use some of 
the same paradigmatic examples from the discipline of genetics to 
establish these points.  For example, both describe “norms of 
reaction” by discussing plants that have different phenotypes in 
different environments, and by pointing out that different people 
gain weight to different degrees when eating similar amounts of 
food (see WC, 137-38 and DME, 45, 81). 
 
 
8 
 
But unlike Wilson’s book, Dobzhansky’s calls for increased study of 
the genetic basis of human behavior was received positively by 
almost all who read it.7   Significantly a great many of those who  
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read Dobzhansky’s book used the word “balance” when extolling 
its virtues; they praised his book for charting a judicious middle 
path between the “Scylla of hereditarianism” that usually crushed 
geneticists and the “Charybdis of environmentalism” that often 
sucked in sociologists.8   Somehow, Dobzhansky was able to steer a 
course between the two extremes, drawing both unconverted 
biologists and social scientists into the new study, while Wilson 
only angered those who were not already converts to his cause.  I 
propose that the rhetorical structure of their books contributed to 
the different receptions they received. 
 
9 
 
I do not mean to suggest that Dobzhansky was simply a better 
rhetor than Wilson.  Because Dobzhansky was writing in the 
1960s, when the institutional power of genetics and sociology put 
these two branches of knowledge on a more level playing field, he 
may have had easy access to a set of rhetorical resources for 
balancing audience interests that Wilson, writing in an age of 
massive advances in the genetic sciences, was not as likely to have.  
After discussing the differences in the rhetorical construction of 
the two books, and the way in which the rhetorical designs of the 
books contributed to their effects, I will further explore why 
Dobzhansky may have employed a more effective set of rhetorical 
resources for the particular speech purpose that he and Wilson 
shared. 
 
 
 
 
A First Look 
at the Rhetorical Styles 
of the Two Books 
 
 
10 
 
A comparison of the thesis statements of the two books gives us 
the first hint of how the rhetorical style of Dobzhansky and Wilson 
differed.  Consider the passage that encapsulated Dobzhansky’s 
argument, a passage cited or paraphrased by five of his reviewers.9 
 
 
 
 
The thesis to be set forth in the present book is that 
man has both a nature and a “history.”  Human 
evolution has two components, the biological or 
organic, and the cultural or superorganic.  These 
components are neither mutually exclusive nor 
independent, but interrelated and interdependent.  
Human evolution cannot be understood as a purely 
biological process, nor can it be adequately described 
as a history of culture.  It is the interaction of biology 
and culture.  There exists a feedback between 
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biological and cultural processes. (DME, 18) 
 
  
 
The structure of this passage is circular, with the main point made 
at the very beginning, then repeated and elaborated in the 
sentences that follow.  The first sentence establishes the terms that 
will be united:  “nature” and “history.”  Then the second sentence 
repeats the idea by offering two synonyms for each of those terms 
(biological or organic, and cultural or superorganic); and once 
again, the opposing concepts are connected with the joining 
conjunction “and.”  The third sentence repeats the idea of 
interconnection, doing so in two ways:  first through a double 
negation (they are neither mutually exclusive nor independent) 
then through a double affirmation (they are interrelated and 
interdependent).  The fourth sentence repeats and elaborates the 
negation, while the fifth and sixth sentence repeat and elaborate 
the affirmation.  All but the third sentence directly name the two 
things that are being drawn together (usually repeating the words 
“biology” and “culture”), and even that sentence manages to center 
around those two things without naming them (referring to them 
as “these components”).  The overall feeling of the passage is of a 
repetitive weaving between the two concepts.  Dobzhansky 
carefully balances opposites while ensuring that they became 
tightly entwined with each other. 
 
 
11 
 
Contrast that passage with Wilson’s thesis statement, cited or 
paraphrased by eight of his reviewers.10  “The central idea of the 
consilience world view is that all tangible phenomena, from the 
birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based on 
material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and 
tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics.” (WC, 266)  The 
directionality in Wilson’s passage is clear.  While Dobzhansky 
tacks back and forth between nature and culture, Wilson plows 
straight ahead to the conclusion that everything can be reduced to 
nature, and more specifically, to that most stable part of nature, 
the “laws of physics.”  Notice how the passage is designed to build 
to a point.  There are two clauses inserted into the sentence to 
suspend meaning (one explaining what is meant by “all tangible 
phenomena,” the other explaining what is meant by “ultimately”), 
so that by the time the “laws of physics” appear at the end, there is 
a sense of climax, a feeling of understanding as the meaning of the 
complex sentence is revealed. 
 
 
12 
 
Like Dobzhansky, Wilson introduces a duality between nature and 
culture into his thesis statement.  But while Dobzhansky balances 
and unites the terms of his duality, Wilson sets his in a continuum  
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– “from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions.”  
Wilson then subsumes the continuum to a term more typically 
associated with one side than the other; the “laws of physics” are 
usually invoked to explain the birth of stars, but Wilson’s thesis 
extends them along the continuum to explain the workings of 
social institutions as well.  Thus one side of the duality is reduced 
to the terms of the other, and the continuum becomes a hierarchy. 
 
 
 Metaphor Choice and Sentence Structure  
 
13 
 
This structure of directionality and hierarchy is used by Wilson 
throughout his book, even in the more subtle “soft” passages, 
where he otherwise balances nature and culture in an 
“interactionist” account similar to Dobzhansky’s own.  For 
example, in one of the most even-handed appeals of his book, 
Wilson urges his readers “to unite the great branches of learning 
and end the culture wars” by viewing the boundary between the 
natural sciences and the humanities/social sciences “not as a 
territorial line but as a broad and mostly unexplored terrain 
awaiting cooperative entry from both sides” (WC, 126).  To support 
this appeal, Wilson proposes that the two sides work together to 
understand the interaction of biology and culture: 
 
 
 
 
We know that virtually all human behavior is 
transmitted by culture.  We also know that biology has 
an important effect on the origin of culture and its 
transmission.  The question remaining is how biology 
and culture interact, and in particular how they 
interact across all societies to create the 
commonalities of human nature.  What, in the final 
analysis, joins the deep, mostly genetic history of the 
species as a whole to the more recent cultural histories 
of its far-flung societies?  That, in my opinion, is the 
nub of the relationship between the two cultures.  It 
can be stated as a problem to be solved, the central 
problem of the social sciences and the humanities, and 
simultaneously one of the great remaining problems 
of the natural sciences. (WC, 126)11 
 
 
  
 
Although this passage assumes a certain degree of balance between 
culture and biology by  naming them both and asking how they 
interact, Wilson inserts directionality and hierarchy into the 
discussion by going on to reveal that he knows “the approximate 
form the answer will take” (WC, 126).  Genes “prescribe” 
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epigenetic rules, which create patterns of behavior that gel into 
cultural universals; in short, a “genetic leash” determines how 
humans behave and how culture develops (WC, 127-28).  There are 
places where the genetic leash is “short” and culture is very closely 
controlled by the genes, and there are places where the genes have 
a “looser” hold on culture, but even then, “the connection is never 
completely broken” (WC, 128).  As the title of the chapter 
proclaims, this connection between genes and culture is not 
reciprocal:  influence moves “From Genes to Culture” (WC, 125).  
The genes “prescribe” human nature, and culture is “its ultimate 
product” (WC, 164).  So although Wilson proclaims that the great 
branches of learning should “unite,” an equal partnership is not 
what he actually describes; genetic explanation is the master, and 
disciplines that focus on the level of culture are urged to follow the 
lead of scientists studying the genes. 
 
14 
 
Contrast Wilson’s metaphor of the “genetic leash” with the 
metaphors Dobzhansky uses to describe the connection between 
biology and culture.  Dobzhansky argues that the genetic 
endowments of human beings evolved “hand in hand” with the 
development of culture (DME, 75, 193).  “In short, nature is not 
sovereign over some traits and potentialities and nurture over 
others; they share all traits in condominium” (DME, 97).  Although 
some would say “that the genes determine the limits up to which, 
but not beyond which, a person’s development may advance,” 
Dobzhansky protests that “this confuses the issue,” for “there is no 
way to predict all the phenotypes that a given genotype might yield 
in every one of the infinity of possible environments” (DME, 76).  
Indeed, since man adapts “his environments to his genes more 
often than his genes to his environments,” in a sense, “it may be 
said that man has escaped from the clutches of his biological past 
and has become to some extent the master, rather than a slave, of 
his genes” (DME, 319).  But this does not mean that “the evolution 
of culture has suspended and superseded biological evolution;” 
man lives in both the biological world and the cultural world, so 
“interdependence should be the watchword” (DME, 320).  
Examining Dobzhansky’s metaphors of hand-holding, rule by 
condominium, and interdependence, it is not hard to see how they 
give very different impressions than Wilson’s “leash” metaphor. 
 
 
15 
 
The balance Dobzhansky is careful to maintain between nature 
and culture appears not only in his choice of metaphors, but in his 
sentence structure as well.  For example, consider the following 
passage: 
 
Leah Ceccarelli 53 Poroi, 1, 1, January, 2001 
 
 
 
Human evolution has biological and cultural 
components.  Man’s biological evolution changes his 
nature; cultural evolution changes his nurture.  . . . A 
person is what he is because of his nature and his 
nurture.  His genes are his nature, his upbringing is 
his nurture.  The same is true of mankind as a whole: 
its nature is its gene pool, its nurture is its 
environment and its culture. (DME, 23) 
 
 
  
 
As in the thesis statement discussed earlier, the repetition and 
conjunction of the two terms leaves the impression of careful 
balance.  This contrasts with the structure Wilson employs in 
introducing the genetic leash; the passage from Wilson begins with 
apparent balance, but then ends with a question of which side is 
stronger, and answers that question with one side winning the 
battle.  For readers being asked to unite the natural sciences 
(which focus on nature) with the social sciences and humanities 
(which study culture), the image of equal partnership that 
Dobzhansky invokes in metaphor and sentence structure has an 
appeal to it that Wilson’s one-sided image of a genetic leash on 
culture does not.12 
 
 
 
 The Rhetorical Use of Binaries  
 
16 
 
It is interesting to note that both authors recognize the rhetorical 
importance of establishing binaries.  Wilson admits as much when 
he speaks of the genetically influenced tendency of humans “to 
split continuously varying objects and processes into two discrete 
classes” (WC, 164), an inborn trait called the “binary instinct” (WC, 
154).  Dobzhansky also speaks of the “craving of the human mind 
for either-or categories,” a “powerful” craving that is perhaps 
genetically influenced (DME, 319).  Given this shared 
understanding, it is no surprise that both authors would attempt to 
use the impulse toward binaries when designing their arguments.  
But Wilson, while ostensibly pitting extremes against each other in 
order to support a middle ground, always favors one term over the 
other in each of his arguments; in contrast, Dobzhansky is careful 
not to favor either side of the binaries he creates. 
 
 
17 
 
For example, Wilson distinguishes nurturists, who “traditionally 
emphasize the contributions of the environment to behavior,” from 
hereditarians, who “emphasize the genes” (WC, 142).  In a 
seemingly even-handed move, he promises to “try to establish a 
common ground between them” that would help end the “endless 
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ideological bickering” between adversaries who talk past one 
another (WC, 142).  But this “common ground” turns out to be 
located in the territory of one side and not the other:  “Refined 
with the more precise concepts of genetics, nurturists can now be 
seen to believe that human behavioral genes have very broad 
norms of reaction, while hereditarians think the norms are 
relatively narrow” (WC, 142).  According to Wilson, when we look 
at the issue from the superior perspective of genetics, we see that 
nurturists “think that culture is held on a very long genetic leash” 
while hereditarians “believe the leash is short” (WC, 143).  The 
problem of determining which is true is “empirical in nature,” 
according to Wilson, and it can be solved, as he promises to reveal 
later in the book (WC, 143).  The very fact that Wilson reframes the 
issue in terms of the “genetic leash” foreshadows the solution he 
will offer:  “In general, the epigenetic rules are strong enough to be 
visibly constraining” (WC, 158). 
 
18 
 
In another ostensibly mediating passage, Wilson calls for the end 
to the “drawn-out Verdun and Somme” of the culture wars that pit 
social scientists against biologists in a “clash of antipodean views.”  
“Within the broad middle ground between the strong versions of 
the Standard Social Science Model and genetic determinism, the 
social sciences are intrinsically compatible with the natural 
sciences” (WC, 188).  But directly before and after this call, Wilson 
once again suggests that his own sympathies are firmly located in 
the territory of one side rather than the other.  He attacks 
sociology, which he says “remains today the stronghold of the 
Standard Social Science Model,” a belief that culture is “an 
independent phenomena irreducible to elements of biology and 
psychology” (WC, 188).  According to Wilson, this view is wrong 
because it turns the “sequence of causation upside down” (WC, 
188).  Social scientists, stuck in the “early, natural-history” stage of 
their own development, “lack what can be called a truly scientific 
theory” (WC, 189).  The antipodean view, “genetic determinism,” is 
the “belief that human behavior is fixed in the genes” (WC, 188).  
But Wilson never explains the problem with this other view; he 
does not name modern biology as its “stronghold,” nor does he 
dish out equally strong critiques against it.  Although he calls for a 
middle ground, his own book does not stay on neutral territory; 
instead, he attacks one side of the controversy, and ignores the 
problems with the other side. 
 
 
19 
 
Dobzhansky describes a similar conflict between two views that are 
“polar opposites” in his own book (18).  But unlike Wilson, he 
stands firmly on the ground between the two extremes, shooting  
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equal reprobation at both sides.  He admits that because “scientists 
are human, and they are tempted to think that their discoveries 
explain everything instead of something,” some of them have 
fancied the “genetic fallacy” which has “made biology an easy prey 
to social Darwinists, racists, and unscrupulous politicians” (DME, 
18).  Perhaps not unsurprisingly, “social scientists reacted to the 
exaggerated biologism by a converse exaggeration” that claims 
mankind evolves by culture only (DME, 18).  In describing the 
conflict in this way, Dobzhansky attacks both sides, concluding 
that neither is correct.  “Dichotomies are tempting; to dichotomize 
is one way to clarify an argument.  But the dichotomy of biological 
and cultural evolution is misleading if pushed too far” (DME, 19).   
 
20 
 
Later in the book, in a chapter titled “Environmentalist Thesis and 
Hereditarian Antithesis,” Dobzhansky identifies anthropologist 
Leslie White as a believer in the “environmentalist” extreme that 
favors cultural evolution, and biologist C. D. Darlington as a 
believer in the “hereditarian” extreme that favors biological 
evolution; in doing so, Dobzhansky gives equal space to his 
critique of each, connecting variants of both to despicable figures – 
the former to Stalin and the latter to Hitler (DME, 54).  In another 
part of the book, when discussing mental disorders, he contrasts 
the “psychoanalytic schools,” which have stressed experiences in 
the lives of patients and “concluded that the role of the genetic 
variables must therefore be negligible,” with those who take the 
discovery of genetic factors to mean “that environmental agencies 
are unimportant.”  Attacking both, Dobzhansky proclaims:  “the 
two misconceptions are, indeed, worthy of each other!” (DME, 
309).  In each case, Dobzhansky sets up a dichotomy in which both 
sides are awarded equal reproach.  Wilson, consistent with his 
preference for hierarchy and directionality, uses the binary instinct 
to imply the superiority of one side over the other.  In contrast, 
Dobzhansky uses the same binary instinct to encourage a balanced 
rejection of either extreme in favor of a synthesis that unites the 
two. 
 
 
 
 
Other Rhetorical Differences 
Between the Two Texts  
 
21 
 
As suggested earlier, the substance and stated purpose of the two 
books is very similar.  But one uses metaphors, sentence 
structures, and argument strategies that instill directionality and 
hierarchy in the relationship between biology and culture, while 
the other uses metaphors, sentence structures, and argument 
 
Leah Ceccarelli 56 Poroi, 1, 1, January, 2001 
strategies that invoke balance.  As a result, most readers of one 
were left angrily opposed to connecting genetics and the social 
sciences in a new interdisciplinary study, while most readers of the 
other were left feeling good about such a study. 
 
22 
 
Of course, there are other reasons that Dobzhansky achieved 
assent from so many of his readers, while Wilson sparked 
controversy.  As my other work on Wilson’s text shows, his 
hostility toward workers in the social sciences and humanities is 
palpable in the most extreme passages of his book and turns off 
many of his readers.  In addition, the fanatical reductionism he 
waves like a flag is not a banner that most readers are comfortable 
saluting.13  Dobzhansky made neither mistake. 
 
 
23 
 
Rather than promote an imperialistic conquest by natural 
scientists of territory being mishandled by backward social 
scientists and scholars of the humanities, Dobzhansky recognizes 
the contribution that social scientists and scholars of the 
humanities could make to a collaborative endeavor.  According to 
Dobzhansky, we should not conclude that “evolution, biology, or 
science is irrelevant to wisdom” which is the source and validation 
of ethics, but neither should we assume that biology has all the 
answers:  “Wisdom includes also other insights,” and recognizing 
this fact is “not an apologia for ignorance or even for the irrational 
man” (DME, 344). 
 
 
24 
 
An example of the way the two authors treat the relationship 
between the disciplines can be seen in their contrasting 
discussions of Freud.  Wilson treats Freud harshly, setting up a 
dichotomy between the successful biological sciences and the 
“mostly wrong” pseudoscience of psychoanalysis (WC, 74-81).  In 
contrast, Dobzhansky insists that psychoanalysis and genetics are 
not necessarily incompatible, and that in spite of the fact that the 
former should adopt more reliable procedures for testing and 
verifying theories, “it would be shallow to reject the whole matter 
as ‘unscientific.’  . . . the discoveries of Freud and his successors are 
probably amenable to interpretation in agreement with the 
concepts of modern genetics” (DME, 64-66). 
 
 
25 
 
In addition to treating the social sciences and humanities with 
more respect than Wilson chooses to display, Dobzhansky 
recognizes something that Wilson does not:  that unification of 
knowledge does not require a strong commitment to 
reductionism.  Consider the appeal of the following passage from 
Dobzhansky’s book: 
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Now, even though biological phenomena are 
specialized patterns of chemical and physical ones, 
biology is not simply a branch of chemistry or physics; 
biological laws and regularities must be studied as 
such, they cannot be deduced from chemistry and 
physics.  The systematic and organized character of 
culture makes it legitimate, even necessary, to 
discover the regularities and laws that may exist in its 
structure and development.  It does not follow 
however, that biology is irrelevant to the 
understanding of culture, even as chemistry is not 
irrelevant to biology (DME, 73). 
 
 
  
 
Adopting this view, Dobzhansky is able to show social scientists 
(and scholars of the humanities) that a biological study of human 
nature does not threaten the autonomy of their fields.14  At the 
same time, he is able to suggest the benefit of connecting the 
different forms of knowledge.  This contrasts with Wilson’s explicit 
reductionism that claims biological, cultural, and even ethical 
precepts can be deduced from the laws of chemistry and physics 
(WC, 67-68, 91, 266). 
 
 
26 
 
I have discussed the rampant disciplinary imperialism and explicit 
reductionism of Wilson’s Consilience elsewhere, and will therefore 
not go into more detail about their negative effects or the ways in 
which he might have avoided them, beyond pointing out that 
Dobzhansky successfully persuaded his readers to look at the 
contributions of genetics to our understanding of social behavior 
without resorting to such appeals.  In fact, Dobzhansky’s readers 
were most likely persuaded because he avoided such severe 
“revolutionary” terms for describing the new relationship between 
disciplines that he was promoting. 
 
 
 
 Conclusions  
 
27 
 
In this paper, I have shown that even the most “soft” appeals of 
Wilson’s book were subtly marked with the scars of directionality 
and hierarchy, reminders of the disciplinary imperialism and 
genetic reductionism that influenced the sentence structure, 
metaphors, and argument strategies of his book.  Dobzhansky’s 
theme of balance was in marked contrast to this rhetoric of 
directionality and hierarchy, and I believe it did much to persuade 
his readers to accept his call to action.  
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28 
 
It is likely that Dobzhansky developed a more balanced rhetoric of 
disciplinary unification because he was writing in a time when the 
social power of the biological sciences was growing, but had not yet 
reached the proportions of today’s genetic technoscience.  It was 
not difficult for him to imagine a balance between the different 
domains of knowledge and to promote collaboration across the two 
cultures divide.  Today the completion of the Human Genome 
Project is just one sign of the tremendous power that genetic 
research has gained in our culture.  It is easy to get carried away 
with enthusiasm for the potential of genetic explanation.  In an era 
when so many advances are being made in the field of genetics, it 
is difficult to not favor one side of the two cultures divide over the 
other when predicting future growth of knowledge fields.  
However, if the goal is to persuade people to eliminate the 
disciplinary boundaries that have so long defined their intellectual 
and professional lives, a decent respect for the historical 
conditions of those existing boundaries, and an understanding of 
the interests of those who live on the side that is in danger of losing 
its institutional power is necessary. 
 
 
29 
 
I believe that rhetors like Wilson who recognize the potential 
power of genetic explanation would do well to borrow from 
Dobzhansky’s rhetorical toolbox.  The success of Dobzhansky’s text 
demonstrates that one can develop an excitement for a new kind of 
study without resorting to extremes; in fact, by adopting a 
stereoscopic approach that balances the potential of genetic 
explanation with an understanding of its limitations, one is more 
likely to persuade the undecided to recognize the value of this form 
of study and to offer the institutional and intellectual backing that 
will support its future.  Such an approach would not require 
Wilson to abandon his position or to lie better and more deeply; 
instead it would require him to design his arguments to more fully 
correspond to what he says he really wants his book to do:  to 
“unite the great branches of learning and end the culture wars . . . 
to view the boundary between the scientific and literary cultures 
not as a territorial line but as a broad and mostly unexplored 
terrain awaiting cooperative entry from both sides” (126). 
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